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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board 
independence are effective in reducing the extent of earnings management. Firms that did not 
have a majority of independent directors prior to the reforms (referred to as non-compliance 
firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that, while non-compliance 
firms on average do not experience a significant decrease in earnings management after the 
reforms compared to other firms, non-compliance firms with low information acquisition cost 
experience a significant reduction in earnings management. The results are similar when we 
examine audit committee independence and when we use alternative proxies for information 
acquisition cost and earnings management. These findings indicate that independent directors’ 
monitoring is more effective in a richer information environment.  
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1. Introduction 
In response to the widespread corporate and accounting scandals in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, in 2002, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) proposed new corporate governance rules for the listed firms, which 
were approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2003. These rules required 
the listed firms to have a majority of independent directors on their boards. One of the primary 
objectives of this reform is to enhance the monitoring by the board, particularly the monitoring of 
the financial reporting process. Duchin et al. (2010) examine the impact of this board structure 
reform on firm performance and valuation. They find that after the reform, firms with an increase 
in board independence experience an improvement in firm performance if the information 
acquisition cost for independent directors is low. However, ex ante, it is unclear how the 
increased board independence as a result of this reform will affect earnings management and 
whether earnings management is a channel through which this reform influences firm 
performance, given the mixed evidence on the association of board structure and earnings 
management in the literature.1  
In this paper, we directly test whether an increase in board independence in response to this 
reform is associated with a decrease in earnings management. Moreover, in light of the potential 
ineffectiveness of outside directors’ monitoring due to the lack of information (e.g., Jensen 1993; 
Adam and Ferreira 2007; Duchin et al. 2010), we investigate whether the impact of the increase in 
board independence on earnings management varies with the cost of information acquisition. If 
independent directors’ monitoring is more effective when the cost of information acquisition is 
low, we expect to find a stronger association between the increase in board independence and the 
                                                 
1 While some studies (e.g., Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; Bédard et al. 2004) document a negative association between 
earnings management and the independence of board and/or audit committee, other studies (e.g., Vafeas 2005; 
Larcker et al. 2007) provide conflicting results. See Section 2.2 for detailed discussions.  
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reduction in earnings management for firms with lower information acquisition cost than for those 
with higher information acquisition cost. Our tests thus (1) provide evidence on the effectiveness 
of the board structure reform in reducing the extent of earnings management and (2) complement 
Duchin et al. (2010) by shedding light on one of the channels through which increases in board 
independence can enhance firm value. 
Our sample includes 1,587 firms with board data from BoardEx for the period 2000-2005. 
We split the sample into two groups. The first group, 55 percent of the sample, satisfied the 
regulatory requirement before the reform and is referred to as compliance firms; the second 
group, 45 percent of the sample, is referred to as non-compliance firms. To comply with the 
regulatory requirements, non-compliance firms have to increase board independence. Exploiting 
this exogenous change in board independence for non-compliance firms, we adopt a difference-
in-differences research design. Specifically, we use an indicator for non-compliance firms as the 
instrument for the ex-post increase in board independence and use compliance firms to control for 
the time-trend of earnings management during our sample period (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008). In the 
main tests, we examine whether there is a significant reduction in earnings management from the 
pre- to post-regulation period for non-compliance firms relative to compliance firms and whether 
the reduction is greater for non-compliance firms with lower information acquisition cost. As an 
alternative research design, we use the non-compliance indicator to predict the change in board 
independence and base our tests on the predicted change in board independence; we obtain similar 
results.  
Both anecdotal evidence and our own exploration suggest that increases in board 
independence primarily occur between 2002 and 2004 and that board independence levels are 
relatively stable prior to 2002 and after 2004. Thus, we use the period 2000-2001 as the pre-
regulation period and 2005-2006 as the post-regulation period. The extent of earnings 
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management in the pre- or post- regulation period is proxied by the average of the absolute value 
of performance-matched discretionary accruals (|DA|) over the corresponding period.  
We find that on average, compared to compliance firms, non-compliance firms do not 
experience a significant reduction in earnings management from the pre- to post-regulation 
period. More interestingly, we find that the reduction in earnings management for non-
compliance firms decreases with information acquisition cost. Non-compliance firms with low 
information acquisition cost experience a significant decrease in earnings management compared 
to non-compliance firms with high information acquisition cost. These results indicate that while 
the increase in board independence itself does not reduce earnings management, a richer 
information environment can facilitate independent directors’ monitoring, resulting in a decrease 
in earnings management. These findings hold for various proxies of information acquisition cost. 
In the main analyses, we use an aggregate information score, based on trading volume, bid-ask 
spread, analyst coverage and forecast error, as the inverse proxy for information acquisition cost 
faced by outsiders in obtaining firm-specific information (Andersen et al. 2009). In the sensitivity 
tests we use other proxies, including the information cost measure in Duchin et al. (2010), analyst 
coverage, and industry homogeneity.  
We conduct several additional analyses to provide additional insights. First, we obtain 
similar inferences when we use the latent analysis. Under the latent analysis, the sample is 
grouped into clusters so that observations within each cluster follow a similar model.2 For our 
tests, the number of clusters is determined to be two. In cluster I, an increase in board 
independence is significantly associated with a decrease in earnings management; whereas in 
cluster II, the association is insignificant. We find that firms in cluster I have significantly lower 
information acquisition cost than those in cluster II, consistent with the inference that low 
                                                 
2 See Larcker and Richardson (2004) for detailed discussions of the latent analysis.  
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information acquisition cost is an important condition for the link between increases in board 
independence and decreases in earnings management. Second, the inferences hold for the Dechow 
and Dichev’s (2002) earnings quality measure or the Roychowdhury’s (2006) real earnings 
management proxy. Third, we examine audit committee independence and find qualitatively 
similar results.3 Fourth, we directly link our findings to Duchin et al. (2010) by investigating 
whether the reduction in earnings management is one of the channels through which board 
independence increases firm value. Using a similar research design as in Core et al. (1999) and 
Bowen et al. (2008), we find that the change in earnings management explained by the increased 
board independence and information acquisition cost is negatively correlated with future 
performance. That is, the larger the reduction in earnings management, the better the future 
performance is. Such evidence indicates that increased board independence reduces opportunistic 
earnings management when information acquisition cost is low, leading to better firm 
performance. Lastly, we conduct additional analyses to address an alternative explanation that 
firms with low information acquisition cost are under greater pressure to hire better qualified 
directors, and the difference in director qualifications drives the documented results. When we 
compare the characteristics of newly appointed independent directors between non-compliance 
firms with high and those with low information acquisition cost, we find that those directors have 
similar employment background and do not differ in financial expertise. We also find that these 
two groups of firms have a similar number of board meetings, a proxy for directors’ effort. Thus, 
we find no evidence supportive of this alternative explanation.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, it provides direct 
                                                 
3 We focus on board independence in the main analyses and examine audit committee independence in the additional 
analyses for the following reasons. First, while the audit committee directly oversees the financial reporting process, 
it reports to the board, which is ultimately responsible for all important decisions. Second, as discussed in detail in 
Section 2.1, regulatory reforms on audit committee independence spanned a longer period, making the difference-in-
differences research design less powerful.  
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evidence on whether and under what conditions recent regulatory reforms on board independence 
affect earnings management. These regulatory reforms represent unprecedented responses to 
several high-profile corporate scandals. Since earnings management is one of the main drivers of 
the reforms, it is important to investigate whether these reforms effectively curb earnings 
management. Second, our paper complements Duchin et al. (2010) by showing that the reduction 
in earnings management is a channel through which increases in board independence improve 
firm value. Third, our paper contributes to the broad literature on corporate governance and 
earnings management. Board independence and earnings management are likely endogenously 
determined (e.g., Larcker et al. 2007; Guay 2008; Bushman 2009). Unlike prior studies, we 
exploit an exogenous change in board structure.4 Such an analysis is less likely to be subject to 
endogeneity. We also build on the notion that outside directors’ monitoring is enhanced by their 
access to firm-specific information and shed light on the circumstances under which the 
monitoring of outside directors is more effective.5 
Over the sample period, there are other concurrent regulatory changes such as the internal 
control disclosure requirement under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). We use a 
difference-in-differences approach to control for the other regulatory and economic changes 
during the sample period that may affect the extent of earnings management. We have also 
conducted additional tests to ensure that our inferences are robust to other regulatory changes. 
Nonetheless, we would like to point out that because of the many regulatory changes over the 
                                                 
4  While regulatory reforms are not exogenous in the sense that they are responses to corporate scandals, the 
regulatory requirements are largely exogenous to individual firms.  
5 Given that we find that increased board independence reduces earnings management for firms with better 
information environment, it is natural to ask why these firms do not choose to increase board independence before the 
reforms. There are several possible reasons. First, managers may be entrenched and reluctant to do so. The market 
force may not be powerful enough to lead to the desired change in board structure due to free rider and information 
asymmetry problems (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2007; Duchin et al. 2010). Second, even if managers are not 
entrenched, there are transaction costs associated with changing board structure, including costs of board selection, 
contract costs with directors, and legal costs (Coles et al. 2008). The transaction costs can explain firms’ deviation 
from optimal board structure for a prolonged period of time. 
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sample period, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that our results might be attributed to 
the other contemporaneous regulatory changes.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the regulatory background, 
related research and our hypotheses; Section 3 describes the sample and data; Section 4 presents 
the main analyses; Section 5 reports additional analyses; and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Background, related research and hypothesis development 
2.1 Recent regulatory reforms on board independence  
In response to several highly publicized financial reporting failures (e.g., Enron and 
WorldCom), in 2002 the NYSE and NASD proposed new corporate governance rules requiring 
that the board consist of a majority of independent directors. The criteria for independent directors 
are greatly clarified. In essence, a director is independent if (s)he does not accept any significant 
compensatory fee from the firm (other than the director fee) and is not an affiliated person of the 
firm or its subsidiary. These new rules were approved by the SEC in 2003. Listed companies had 
until the first annual meeting in 2004 to comply with the new rules.  
The reforms related to audit committee independence spanned a longer period. There had 
been exchange rules in place regarding audit committee independence since 1980’s, and the 
exchanges further tightened the rules in 1999.6 Responding to calls to improve the financial 
reporting process, in 1999 the NYSE and NASD required that the listed firms maintain an audit 
committee of at least three directors, all of whom must be independent. Section 301 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 has similar requirements and enhances the exchange rules by 
spelling out the responsibilities of the audit committee.    
                                                 
6 For example, in 1987 the NYSE required that the listed firms have an audit committee consisting solely of 
independent directors, and in 1989 the NASD required that the listed firms have an audit committee with the majority 
of the members being independent. Despite these rules, the definition of independent directors is not entirely clear, 
and firms often have affiliated directors sitting on audit committees (Vicknair et al. 1993). 
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Because the regulatory reforms on audit committee independence spanned a longer period, 
the analysis of the change in audit committee independence is more likely to be confounded by 
contemporaneous events. As a result, we focus on the increase in the overall board independence 
in the main analyses and examine the increase in audit committee independence in an additional 
analysis.  
2.2 Related research  
Prior research has examined the association between board independence and earnings 
management, but the evidence to date is somewhat mixed. Using a sample of 692 firm-years in 
the period 1992-1993, Klein (2002) finds that the extent of earnings management is negatively 
correlated with board and audit committee independence.. While some later studies confirm the 
negative association between earnings management and the independence of board and/or audit 
committee (e.g., Bedard et al. 2004), other studies find conflicting results. For example, Vafeas 
(2005), Agrawal and Chadha (2005), and Larcker et al. (2007) document an insignificant 
correlation between board/audit committee independence and earnings management. 7  
The mixed evidence in prior studies may be related to the endogeneity between board 
independence and earnings management. As pointed out by Larcker et al. (2007), Guay (2008), 
and Bushman (2009), board independence and earnings management can be part of a general 
equilibrium and be endogenously determined. Using change regressions does not solve this issue 
either, because the change in earnings management and the change in board independence can be 
driven by the same unobservable firm and CEO characteristics. Compared to the prior studies, we 
take advantage of the regulatory requirement of increases in board independence, an exogenous 
shock to the firms affected. While not a perfect setting (e.g., there may be confounding concurrent 
                                                 
7 Romano (2005) surveys the literature on the impact of audit committee independence on earnings management and 
finds that while six studies find a negative association, 10 others fail to find a significant association. 
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regulatory changes), the endogeneity problem is less of a concern here than in prior research. In 
addition, we extend the literature by investigating whether the effectiveness of boards in reducing 
earnings management varies with information acquisition cost faced by outside directors.  
Our paper is also related to several recent studies that use the same setting to examine the 
impact of the board structure reforms on firm performance and value. Apart from Duchin et al. 
(2010), as discussed earlier, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) study the overall market reaction 
to the rule announcements and find that firms that are not compliant with the rules prior to the 
reform (i.e., non-compliance firms) are associated with positive abnormal returns compared to 
other firms, but the positive abnormal returns only apply to large non-compliance firms. Our 
study complements the above two studies by focusing on earnings management. The findings on 
the overall firm value do not necessarily apply to individual corporate decisions, as shown in the 
case of compensation practices.8 By providing direct evidence on earnings management, our 
study sheds light on one of the channels through which increases in board independence can 
enhance firm value. To further establish the link, we find that the decrease in the extent of 
earnings management, as explained by the change in board independence, is associated with an 
improvement in firm performance.  
2.3 Increases in board independence and earnings management: H1 
Under the new rules, firms must have a majority of independent directors on their boards. 
Prior to this requirement, firms had different levels of board independence. Some firms already 
had a majority independent board. The reforms, therefore, did not affect them, and we refer to 
them as compliance firms. Other firms, in contrast, did not have a majority independent board 
prior to the reforms. We refer to those as non-compliance firms. Non-compliance firms have to 
                                                 
8 Guthrie et al. (2012) find that the increase in board independence is not associated with a reduction in excessive 
executive compensation. While Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) document a reduction in excessive executive 
compensation for non-compliance firms after the reform, Guthrie et al. (2012) find that their results are driven by a 
few outliers. Our results are robust to outliers. See Section 4 for detail.  
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increase board independence in order to comply with the new rules.  
Compared to other directors, independent directors are less subject to managers’ influence 
and are hence more objective. If independent directors are more effective monitors than other 
directors, an increase in board independence can reduce the extent of earnings management. If 
this is the case, non-compliance firms are expected to have a larger decrease in earnings 
management from the pre- to the post-regulation period, compared to compliance firms. Our first 
hypothesis is thus stated as (in alternative form): 
H1: Compared to compliance firms, non-compliance firms experience a larger decrease in 
earnings management from the pre- to the post-regulation period.  
 
We might not find results consistent with H1 for the following reasons. First, the increase in 
board independence as a response to the reform may be primarily window dressing (e.g., Romano 
2005). Second, the outside directors’ monitoring role might be hindered by their lack of 
information. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that “unless boards are given better 
access to information, simply increasing board independence is not sufficient to improve 
governance.” Below we discuss the information access issue and develop our second hypothesis.  
2.4 Information acquisition cost, board independence and earnings management: H2 
By their nature, independent directors have less information than managers. While having 
access to the management for information, independent directors might have difficulty obtaining 
necessary information for monitoring purposes (Raheja 2005). For example, knowing that 
independent directors are tougher monitors, managers may be reluctant to share important 
information with them (Adams and Ferrira 2007; Harris and Raviv 2008).  
The information concern is shared by both academia and directors. For example, Jensen 
(1993, p. 864) states that “the CEO almost always determines the agenda and information given to 
the board. This limitation on information severely hinders the ability of even highly talented 
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board members to contribute effectively to the monitoring and evaluation of the CEO and the 
firm’s strategy.” The surveys conducted by KPMG in 2004 and 2010 among audit committee 
members indicate that about half of the audit committee members rate the information prepared 
by the management before the committee meeting as of moderate or low quality and that audit 
committee members often have to cultivate relationships with managers in order to obtain useful 
information. Most of the surveyed board members indicate that one of the most important ways to 
improve board effectiveness is to improve the information they have.  
The above discussions suggest that the effectiveness of outside directors as monitors of 
financial reporting is hindered by poor information access. Therefore, the monitoring of outside 
directors will be more effective when information acquisition cost is lower.9 If this is the case, 
non-compliance firms with lower information acquisition cost should experience a greater 
decrease in earnings management from the pre- to the post-regulation period than other non-
compliance firms. Thus, our second hypothesis is (stated in alternative form): 
H2: Compared to other non-compliance firms, non-compliance firms with lower 
information acquisition cost experience a greater decrease in earnings management 
from the pre- to the post-regulation period.  
 
3. Sample and data 
3.1 Sample selection and the measurement of earnings management 
As mentioned earlier, we use the period 2000-2001 as the pre-regulation benchmark period 
and 2005-2006 as the post-regulation period. The rule of majority board independence was 
proposed in 2002 and adopted in 2003; firms are required to comply with it no later than the end 
of 2004. As in prior studies, we find that firms responded to the new regulations by increasing 
board independence, primarily over the period 2002-2004.  
                                                 
9 This is consistent with our private conversations with several directors, who indicate that they periodically obtain 
information from sources other than the management prior to board meetings. DeFranco et al. (2010) also argue that 
outside directors are more informed and are more effective monitors when firms make more public disclosures. 
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We obtain information on the structure of boards from the BoardEx. We start with firms that 
have board information over 2000-2005 from BoardEx.10 We first exclude the controlled firms 
because they are exempt from the majority independent board requirement.11 We also exclude 
firms in the financial and utilities industries because the commonly used earnings management 
measures may be problematic for these industries (e.g., Becker et al. 1998). We then require that 
the sample firms have financial information from Compustat and stock price information from 
CRSP for the pre- and post-regulation periods. Lastly, we require that firms have non-missing 
discretionary accruals for the pre- and post-regulation periods. Our final sample consists of 1,587 
firms.  
Following prior studies (e.g., Klein 2002; Kothari et al. 2005; Yu 2008; Cohen et al. 2008), 
we measure the extent of earnings management using the absolute value of performance-matched 
discretionary accruals (|DA|). As described in Appendix A, we estimate the accruals model using 
data from the Compustat population for each industry-year that has at least fifteen observations 
(industries defined as in Fama and French (1997)). To ensure that our results are not driven by a 
particular year, we compare the average |DA| between the pre-regulation period, 2000-2001, and 
the post-regulation period, 2005-2006.  
3.2 Compliance vs. non-compliance firms and change in board independence 
We rely on the BoardEx’s definition of independent directors; a director is regarded as 
independent if he or she is neither affiliated with the firm nor currently an employee of the firm.12 
We separate firms based on whether they satisfied the regulatory requirement of majority 
                                                 
10 BoardEx covers S&P 1500 firms as well as smaller firms. The most important advantage of using BoardEx is to 
increase the generalizability of the results. Since the board data for smaller firms in BoardEx is somewhat limited for 
the period 2000-2002, we hand collect the information on board structure from proxy statements for the period 2000-
2002 if such information is missing in BoardEx. 
11 If more than 50 percent of a firm’s voting power is held by an individual, a group of individuals who agree to vote 
together, or another firm, the firm is classified as a controlled firm. We use the proxy statements to identify the 
controlled firms.  
12 According to the BoardEx, affiliated directors include those who are former employees of the firm, providers of 
professional services to the firm, customers or suppliers of the firm, or family members of an employee.  
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independent board in 2000. Firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 are 
referred to as non-compliance firms, and firms that did are referred to as compliance firms. Of the 
1,587 firms in our sample, 722 are non-compliance firms and 865 are compliance firms.  
Table 1 presents the board independence over time. For compliance firms, the average 
percentage of independent directors increases modestly from 67.99 percent in 2000 to 76.81 
percent in 2005, and the percentage of firms with a majority independent board experiences a 
small decrease, from 100 percent (by construction) to 98.15 percent. In contrast, for non-
compliance firms, the average percentage of independent directors increases from 38.82 percent 
in 2000 to 69.93 percent in 2005.13 The percentage of firms with a majority independent board 
increases from 0 percent (by construction) to 94.32 percent.14  
As mentioned earlier, because non-compliance firms are required to increase board 
independence, we use the non-compliance indicator as an instrument for the increase in board 
independence as a response to the reform. This ex ante indicator is highly correlated with the ex 
post increase in board independence and has the advantage of being largely exogenous to our 
dependent variable of interest – the ex post change in earnings management.15  
In addition, we adopt the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) approach and use the predicted 
change in board independence as an alternative explanatory variable. Specifically, in the first 
                                                 
13 Non-compliance firms can increase board independence by (i) hiring new independent directors and/or (ii) retiring 
old affiliated or insider directors. Overall, our sample firms do not experience a significant change in board size, with 
a mean (median) board size of 8.51 (8.00) in 2000 and 8.58 (8.00) in 2005 (untabulated). 
14 Based on our reading of firms’ proxy statements, the primary reason why some firms did not comply with the 
requirement by 2005 based on the BoardEx’s definition is the difference in the definition of independent directors 
between the firm and BoardEx. BoardEx’s definition tends to be stricter. For example, while the regulatory definition 
of past employees refers to employees within the last three years, BoardEx tends to regard directors with any 
employment history with the company as past employees. In some cases, the firm applies the rule loosely. For 
example, some firms classify directors with business relationships with the firm as independent directors, arguing that 
these relationships do not interfere with such directors’ independence. BoardEx classifies all such directors as 
affiliated. 
15 Note that we are interested in increases in board independence in general. We use the non-compliance indicator as 
the instrument for increases in board independence. We are not implying that 50% is the critical threshold for 
effective board monitoring.  
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stage, we regress the actual change in board independence from 2000 to 2005 on the non-
compliance indicator and firm characteristics in 2000. In the second stage, we use the predicted 
change in board independence from the first-stage regression to explain the change in earnings 
management. Using this variable captures variations in the change in board independence among 
non-compliance firms as well as ensures that our results are robust to alternative measures. 
Panel A of Appendix B reports the first-stage regression results. The non-compliance 
indicator is positively correlated with the change in board independence (coefficient=0.223, 
t=32.31, Column (1)). As noted above, over the sample period, firms are also required to comply 
with the rule of 100% independent audit committee, leading to increase in overall board 
independence. Therefore, in Column (2), we add to the prediction model a non-compliance 
indicator for audit committee (Non_Compliance_Audit), defined as 1 for firms without a 100% 
independent audit committee in 2000. We find that the coefficient on this variable is also 
significantly positive (t=12.65) and that adding this variable increases the explanatory power – the 
adjusted R2 increases from 45.6% to 50.7%. Hence we use the predicted increase in board 
independence from the full model in the second stage analyses. 
3.3 Proxies for information acquisition cost 
For the main analysis, we use an aggregate information score to capture information 
acquisition cost for independent directors. As discussed in Section 2, independent directors are 
not as informed as insiders; in order to obtain additional information, they can rely on sources 
other than management. Hence we use the richness of the information environment (including 
attributes related to financial analysts) to proxy for information access for outside directors.  
We follow Anderson et al. (2009) and construct the information score based on the 
following four variables: (1) turnover – average daily trading volume scaled by the total number 
of shares outstanding, (2) average bid-ask spread over the year – bid-ask spread measured as the 
14 
 
difference between bid and ask price scaled by the average of the two, (3) analyst coverage – the 
number of analysts issuing forecasts in the year, and (4) forecast error – the absolute value of the 
difference between actual earnings per share and the consensus analyst forecast before earnings 
announcements, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the year. We take the average of the 
quintile ranks of these four variables (reverse ranks for bid-ask spread and forecast error) to 
construct the information score (I_Score).16 The quintile ranks are denoted as 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 
and 1; hence I_Score has a range of [0,1]. A higher information score implies a more transparent 
information environment and a lower information acquisition cost. To address the potential 
endogeneity between board independence and information environment (e.g., Linck et al. 2008; 
Armstrong et al. 2014), we measure the information score in 2000 (i.e., in the pre-regulation 
period). This way, the information score should not be confounded by the change in board 
independence from the pre- to the post-regulation period. 
 
4. Empirical analyses 
4.1 Tests of H1: Increases in board independence and changes in earnings management 
4.1.1 Research design 
To test H1, we regress the change in the absolute value of performance-matched 
discretionary accruals (|DA|) from the pre- to the post-regulation period on the non-compliance 
indicator or the predicted change in board independence and control variables:  
HDD '  ControlsβComplianceNon|=DA| 10     (1) 
HDD ''  ControlsβIndBoard|=DA| 10     (1')  
The coefficient on Non-Compliance, D1, captures the incremental change in |DA| for non-
compliance firms compared to compliance firms. Similarly, the coefficient on ∆Board_Ind, D1, 
                                                 
16 For firms without analysts’ forecasts, I_Score is based on the average quintile ranks of turnover, bid-ask spread, 
and analyst coverage.  
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captures the impact of the increase in board independence on the change in earnings management. 
H1 predicts D1 to be negative in both regressions.  
We include the following control variables that may affect the magnitude of DA: 
institutional ownership (INST), return on assets (ROA), the market-to-book ratio (M/B), firm size 
(Size), debt/equity financing (Financing), leverage (LEV), analyst coverage (AC), and the standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations (Std_CFO). These are the commonly used control 
variables in the earnings management literature. To save space, we discuss their measurement and 
the rationale for including them in Appendix A. To be consistent with the measurement of the 
dependent variable, we use the change in these variables between 2000 and 2005 as controls.17 
We also include industry fixed effects to control for the variation in the change in |DA| across 
industries.18  
4.1.2 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on firm characteristics for pre- and post-regulation. We 
use year 2000 for pre-regulation and year 2005 for post-regulation, except for |DA|, for which the 
two-year averages over 2000-2001 and over 2005-2006 are reported. We also present the 
statistical tests of the differences between pre- and post-regulation. Panel A is for the full sample. 
Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), the mean (median) |DA| decreases significantly, from 0.069 
(0.052) in the pre-regulation period to 0.054 (0.040) in the post-regulation period. The mean 
(median) information score is 0.508 (0.500) in the pre-regulation period and 0.519 (0.563) in the 
post-regulation period; the difference is insignificant. With respect to the control variables, we 
find that while the sample firms have stable performance (ROA) over time, they experience a 
significant increase in institutional ownership, firm size, and analyst coverage, and a significant 
                                                 
17 Since Std_CFO, standard deviation of cash flows from operations, needs to be estimated over multiple years, we 
use the period 1998-2001 for pre-regulation and the period 2003-2006 for post-regulation.  
18 Industries are defined as in Fama and French (1997). We note that industry composition is similar between 
compliance and non-compliance firms. 
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decrease in the market-to-book ratio, the frequency of financing activities, leverage, and operating 
volatility. Panels B and C show that these patterns apply to both compliance and non-compliance 
firms.19 In particular, the change in |DA| from the pre- to post-regulation period is not 
significantly different between these two groups of firms, which is inconsistent with H1. Next, we 
formally test H1 using the regression analysis.  
4.1.3 Regression results 
Table 3 reports the regression results. The coefficient on the Non_Compliance indicator is 
insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels. That is, compared to compliance firms, 
non-compliance firms do not experience an incremental change in earnings management. When 
we use the predicted change in board independence in place of the Non_Compliance indicator, the 
inferences remain the same: the coefficient on ∆Board_Ind is insignificantly different from zero.  
With respect to the control variables, we find that firms with an increase in institutional 
ownership and ROA performance experience a decrease in |DA|, and firms with an increase in 
firm size and operation volatility experience an increase in |DA|. The other control variables are 
not significant.  
In summary, the results in Table 3 indicate that non-compliance firms on average do not 
experience an incremental decrease in the extent of earnings management despite the increase in 
their board independence. However, not all non-compliance firms are the same. It is possible that 
while some non-compliance firms experience a decrease in earnings management, others do not 
due to independent directors’ lack of information, leading to insignificant results on average. In 
the next section, we test the role of information access.  
                                                 
19 We formally compare the change in firm characteristics between the compliance and non-compliance firms 
(untabulated). We find that these two groups do not differ except that non-compliance firms experience a larger 
increase in institutional ownership than compliance firms. This finding helps alleviate the concern that systematic 
differences between compliance and non-compliance firms may drive our results. Note that we control for the change 
in firm characteristics and industry fixed effects in the regressions to capture any remaining differences between the 
two groups. 
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4.2 Tests of H2: The role of information access  
To test H2, we add information access score (I_Score) and its interaction with the non-
compliance indicator or the predicted change in board independence to Equations (1) and (1'):  
HDDDD u'  ControlsβScoreIScoreIComplianceNonComplianceNon|=DA| 3210 (2)  
HDDDD u'''  ControlsβScoreIScoreIIndBoardIndBoard|=DA| 310 2  (2')  
As explained in Section 3.3, I_Score is constructed to have a higher value for firms with better 
information access or lower information acquisition cost. For ease of interpretation, in the 
regressions, we standardize I_Score by subtracting the sample mean and then dividing the 
difference by the sample standard deviation, such that the variable has a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of 1. The coefficient on the non-compliance indicator in Equation (2), D1, 
captures the incremental change in |DA| for non-compliance firms that have average information 
access. Similarly, the coefficient on the predicted change in board independence in Equation (2'), 
D1, captures the effect of board independence increases on the change in |DA| for such firms. For 
both Equations (2) and (2'), the coefficient on the interaction term, D2, captures the impact of 
information access on the effect of increases in board independence on earnings management. H2 
predicts D2 to be negative. Note that we control for the level of information score, since the 
information environment may be associated with the firm’s abilities to attract independent 
directors and thus the extent of earnings management.  
Table 4 reports the regression results. Column (1) is based on the non-compliance indicator. 
Consistent with H2, the coefficient on Non_Compliance × I_Score is significantly negative (t=-
3.11). This indicates that the decrease in earnings management for non-compliance firms is 
greater for those with better information access, or lower information acquisition cost. The effect 
is also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in I_Score leads to a reduction 
in |DA| of 0.009, i.e., 0.9% of total assets. It is about 12.5% (15.8 %) of the sample mean of |DA| 
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in the pre- (post-) regulation period for the non-compliance firms. Similarly, in Column (2) which 
is based on the predicted change in board independence, the coefficient on ∆Board_Ind× I_Score 
is significantly negative (t=-3.51), suggesting that board independence improvement is more 
effective in reducing earnings management for firms with a higher information score. 
We conduct sensitivity tests to ensure that our results in Table 4 are robust. For simplicity, 
we present the coefficients on the key variables in Appendix C. As reported, the inferences 
remain similar. First, we run robustness regressions to ensure that our results are not driven by 
outliers. Second, we redefine the pre-regulation period as year 2000 and the post-regulation 
period as year 2005 when measuring ∆|DA|. Third, as shown in Table 1, about 5.7 percent of the 
non-compliance firms still did not have a majority independent board by 2005 based on the 
BoardEx’s definition of independent directors. To ensure that the results are not driven by these 
firms, we redefine the non-compliance indicator based on board information in both 2000 and 
2005: Non_Compliance is set as 1 if the firm did not have a majority independent board in 2000 
but had one in 2005, and 0 otherwise. Fourth, to address the concern that some firms may be in 
compliance with the majority board independence requirement through window dressing, we 
exclude the non-compliance firms that only marginally satisfied the requirement in 2005 (defined 
as firms that would not have satisfied the requirement if one independent director were re-
classified as affiliated) as well as the non-compliance firms that did not satisfy the requirement in 
2005.20 Lastly, we conduct the following sensitivity tests with respect to control variables. We 
control for change in R&D expenditures to address the concern that information acquisition cost 
may be correlated with R&D expenditures. We control for the change in I_Score to address the 
                                                 
20 One would expect the results to be stronger after excluding such firms. We find that the magnitude of the 
coefficient on the interaction term (Non_Compliance× I_Score / ∆Board_Ind× I_Score) indeed becomes larger; 
however, the difference is too small to be statistically significant. Specifically, the coefficient on Non_Compliance× 
I_Score is -0.010 (Appendix C, Panel A, Column (6)) vs. -0.009 (Table 4, Column (1)), and the coefficient on 
∆Board_Ind× I_Score is -0.045 (Appendix C, Panel A, Column (7)) vs. -0.041 (Table 4, Column (2)).  
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concern that the change in information acquisition cost may confound the analyses. We include 
the lagged change in |DA|, measured as the difference in |DA| between 1999 and 2000, to control 
for potential mean reversion of |DA|. We control for the change in the volatility of earnings and 
returns. We replace ROA with cash flows from operations. See Appendix C for details.  
In summary, our analyses indicate that consistent with H2, firms with improved board 
independence are associated with a reduction in earnings management when independent 
directors have easy access to information and are presumably more informed.  
 
5. Additional analyses 
5.1 Latent class regression analysis 
The assumption of a pooled regression is that the same model is appropriate for the entire 
sample. Including the interaction term, ∆Board_Ind × I_Score, in the regressions allows the 
relationship between the change in board independence and the change in earnings management 
to vary with information acquisition cost. An alternative approach is the latent class analysis. 
Under this approach, the sample is grouped into clusters so that observations within each cluster 
follow a similar model. Once the clusters are identified, one can examine the factors that 
differentiate the clusters. Please see Larcker and Richardson (2004) for detailed discussions of 
this approach.  
Table 5, Panel A reports the results. For the regression of ∆|DA| on ∆Board_Ind, the 
number of clusters is determined to be two based on the consistent Akaike information criterion. 
In cluster I (48% of the sample), the coefficient on ∆Board_Ind is significantly negative, 
indicating that within this cluster, an increase in board independence is associated with a decrease 
in earnings management. In cluster II (52% of the sample), the coefficient on ∆Board_Ind is 
insignificant. We then compare the information score (I_Score) between these two clusters. We 
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find that cluster I has significantly higher I_Score than cluster II (0.538 vs. 0.480); the difference 
is about 20% of the standard deviation of I_Score. This is consistent with our inference that 
information access is an important determinant of the relation between increases in board 
independence and decreases in earnings management.  
Meanwhile, as reported in Panel A of Table 5, we find that compared to cluster II, cluster I 
has higher market-to-book ratio, larger size, lower financing, lower leverage, and higher cash 
flow volatility. We also compare the characteristics of the newly appointed directors for non-
compliance firms between the two clusters, including age, employment background, expertise, 
and number of board meetings, and report the results in Panel B of Table 5. We find that the 
newly appointed directors are generally similar between these two clusters except that those for 
cluster I are somewhat more experienced (in terms of the number of firms the directors worked 
for in the past and the number of senior executive positions the directors held in the past). To 
ensure that our results are not confounded by firm and director characteristics that differ between 
the clusters, we include in the regressions the interaction terms between ∆Board_Ind and such 
characteristics (untabulated). The coefficient on ∆Board_Ind × I_Score remains qualitatively 
similar and the newly added interaction terms are generally not significant. The results are 
available upon request.  
5.2 Alternative proxies for information access  
To ensure the robustness of the results, we replicate the analyses in Table 4 using three 
alternative proxies for information access. First, we use the measure developed in Duchin et al. 
(2010), which is based on the average ranking of analyst coverage, forecast error, and forecast 
dispersion (reverse ranks for forecast error and forecast dispersion). Second, we use analyst 
coverage, defined as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who issue forecasts for the 
firm. Third, we use industry homogeneity. For firms in more homogeneous industries, it is 
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relatively easy for independent directors to be informed. We measure industry homogeneity using 
the approach in Parrino (1997). 
Table 6 reports the results. Similar to I_Score, these alternative measures are calculated in 
2000 and standardized for regression analyses. As reported, the interaction term between the non-
compliance indicator or the predicted change in board independence and the information access 
variable has a significantly negative coefficient in all the specifications. This provides further 
support for H2; non-compliance firms with more transparent information environment experience 
a larger decrease in earnings management compared to those with less transparent information 
environment.  
Lastly, we conduct two sensitivity tests using alternative approaches of measuring 
information access; the results are not tabulated to save space. First, instead of defining I_Score as 
average ranking of the underlying variables, we apply the principal component analysis (PCA). 
The PCA is based on turnover, bid-ask spread, and analyst coverage, as forecast error is missing 
for firms without analysts’ forecasts. Only the first factor from the PCA has an eigenvalue greater 
than 1. We redefine I_Score as the first factor from the PCA. The results are similar to those 
reported in Table 4. The coefficient on Non_Compliance × I_Score is -0.011 (t=-3.61) and that on 
∆Board_Ind × I_Score is -0.052 (t=-4.37). Second, to ensure that the results are not driven by 
analyst coverage, we regress I_Score on analyst coverage and use the residual I_Score in the 
analyses. The inferences are similar to those in Table 4. The coefficient on Non_Compliance × 
I_Score is -0.007 (t=-2.33) and that on ∆Board_Ind × I_Score is -0.028 (t=-2.48). 
5.3 Alternative proxies for earnings management 
In this section, we investigate whether the results hold for alternative proxies for earnings 
management: the earnings quality measure in Dechow and Dichev (2002) (|DD|) and the real 
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earnings management proxy in Roychowdbury (2006) (Real_EM).21 Following prior research, we 
first estimate DD as the residual from the cross-sectional estimation of the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model by industry and year and then take the absolute value (industries defined as in Fama 
and French (1997)). Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012), we measure real earnings 
management using abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures. We then 
combine them to capture the overall extent of real earnings management (abnormal production 
costs minus abnormal discretionary expenditures, both scaled by lagged assets).22 We use the 
same research design as in Section 4.  
Table 7 reports the results. The coefficients on Non_Compliance × I_Score and ∆Board_Ind 
× I_Score are significantly negative. These results indicate that improving board independence 
can reduce the extent of working capital management and real earnings management when the 
information acquisition cost is low.  
5.4 Audit committee independence and earnings management 
As discussed above, we do not examine the audit committee independence reform in the 
main analysis because it spans a longer period. However, we acknowledge that compared to the 
board as a whole, the audit committee potentially has a more direct impact on financial reporting 
and thus earnings management. As such, in this section, we test the effect of the change in audit 
committee independence on earnings management. 
                                                 
21 Another commonly used proxy is restatements. However, this proxy is inappropriate in our setting for the 
following reasons. First, the nature of restatements is different between the post-SOX and pre-SOX period. Recent 
studies (Plumlee and Yohn 2008; Scholz 2008; DeFond 2010) argue that post-SOX restatements often result from 
confusion over the interpretation of new accounting standards and have little impact on firm value. Second, we find 
that firms with restatements in the pre-SOX period, particularly those with accounting irregularities as classified in 
Hennes et al. (2008), are unlikely to have restatements in the post-SOX period. Thus, practically one cannot use the 
change specification to study the impact of the change in board independence on the change in restatements. Lastly, 
prior research (e.g., Dyck et al. 2010) finds that analyst coverage can increase the likelihood of accounting frauds 
being detected. One can make similar arguments for board independence. Thus, an analysis of the impact of increased 
board independence on restatements can be confounded by its impact on the detection of misstatements.  
22 We do not use the abnormal level of operating cash flows because both Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012) 
argue that real earnings management activities have an ambiguous effect on operating cash flows.  
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The research design is similar to that for board independence. Specifically, firms without a 
100% independent audit committee in 2000, a total of 759 sample firms, are classified as non-
compliance firms. We use a dummy variable, Non_Compliance_Audit, to indicate these firms. As 
reported in Panel B of Appendix B, this indicator explains the increase in audit committee 
independence; the coefficient on Non_Compliance_Audit is significantly positive (t=52.70, 
Column (1)). We find that the non-compliance indicator based on overall board independence 
(Non_Compliance) also helps explain the increase in audit committee independence (Column 
(2)). As such, we use the full model to generate the predicted change in audit committee 
independence from 2000 to 2005, ∆Audit_Ind.  
We replicate the analyses in Table 4 and report the results in Table 8.23 The results are 
consistent with those based on overall board independence. The coefficients on 
Non_Compliance_Audit × I_Score and ∆Audit_Ind × I_Score are significantly negative (t=-2.93 
and -3.42, respectively).  
In sum, we find similar results when examining the change in audit committee 
independence. These findings suggest that among firms with increases in audit committee 
independence, those with better information access experience a larger decrease in earnings 
management. 
5.5 Linking our findings to Duchin et al. (2010): the reduction in earnings management and 
improvement in firm performance 
Duchin et al.’s (2010) finding that the non-compliance firms with low information 
acquisition cost experience an improvement in firm performance may be explained by the 
                                                 
23 We also replicate the analyses in Table 3 using Non_Compliance_Audit and ∆Audit_Ind. We find that both 
variables are insignificant in explaining the change in |DA|; we do not tabulate the results to save space. 
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reduction in earnings management for such firms.24  
To validate this conjecture, we examine the association between future firm performance 
and the change in |DA| that is explained by the increase in board independence and information 
access. Specifically, we measure the predicted change in |DA| as the sum of the product of 
'Board_Ind, I_Score, 'Board_Ind × I_Score and their corresponding coefficient estimates as 
reported in Column (2) of Table 4. Following Bowen et al. (2008), we measure future firm 
performance using the average cash flow from operations (CFO) and return on assets (ROA) in 
the post-regulation period (i.e., 2005-2006) and we use similar control variables.  
We report the regression results in Table 9. Consistent with the conjecture that the reduction 
in earnings management leads to improved firm performance, we find that the predicted change in 
|DA| is negatively correlated with future CFO and ROA (t=-2.61 and -2.65, respectively). That is, 
the greater the reduction in earnings management, the better the future performance is. The results 
are similar when we further control for the level of |DA| in the post-regulation period, indicating 
that the results are not driven by the mechanical association between discretionary accruals and 
firm performance.  
In sum, these results are consistent with the notion that a reduction in earnings management 
is one of the mechanisms through which an improvement in board monitoring can lead to better 
firm performance. 
5.6 Alternative explanation: market pressure  
An alternative explanation for our results is that the information environment may proxy for 
the market pressure. Firms with a richer information environment are typically bigger and more 
                                                 
24 Opportunistic earnings management can lead to poor future performance for two reasons. First, it can disguise 
managers’ rent extraction and waste of firm resources. Second, it can lead to less informative earnings, reducing 
contracting efficiency and investment efficiency. For example, Beyer et al. (2014) show analytically that when the 
cost of earnings management is higher (and the extent of earnings management is lower), the board can better 
motivate executives to work for the interest of shareholders, leading to better firm performance.   
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visible and have higher institutional ownership. For these firms, the market pressure to adhere to 
the spirit of the regulatory requirements can therefore be stronger. It thus follows that non-
compliance firms with richer information environment may pick directors who have more 
expertise and are thus more effective monitors, compared to non-compliance firms with poorer 
information environment.  
To address this alternative explanation, we collect information on the characteristics of the 
newly appointed directors for non-compliance firms. We find that the newly appointed directors 
in non-compliance firms with information score above the sample median are similar to those in 
non-compliance firms with information score below the median in terms of age, employment 
background, and financial expertise.25 We also find that these two groups of firms have a similar 
number of board meetings, a proxy for directors’ efforts. Therefore, we conclude that our results 
are not driven by the differences in the attributes of newly appointed independent directors in 
non-compliance firms with low and high information acquisition cost.  
5.7 Alternative explanation: other contemporaneous regulatory changes   
Another possible explanation for our results is that they capture the effect of other 
contemporaneous regulatory changes. However, this explanation only holds if the regulatory 
changes are correlated with the information score for the group of non-compliance firms because 
our variable of interest is the interaction term Non_Compliance ×I_Score. We control for the 
level of I_Score throughout the analyses, thus alleviating this concern. See Duchin et al. (2010) 
for similar discussions. 
Among the regulatory changes, the internal control disclosure requirement (Section 404 of 
SOX) is related to firm size and hence the information environment. Small firms (i.e., those with 
                                                 
25 Note that this result appears to contrast with the latent analysis (Section 5.1). For the latent analysis, we find that 
while the newly appointed directors are generally similar between the two clusters, they are more experienced for 
cluster I where we find a negative association between increases in board independence and decreases in earnings 
management (Table 5, Panel B). This inconsistency is likely due to the different research methods used.  
26 
 
public float below $75 million) are exempt from Section 404. We conduct additional tests to 
ensure that our results are not confounded by Section 404. First, we exclude from our sample the 
firms that are exempt from Section 404 (164 firms). Second, for the sample firms subject to 
Section 404, we control for firm size, an indicator for internal control weakness, and their 
interactions with the non-compliance indicator. The inferences remain similar. In addition, we 
perform the following tests to address the general concern that the regulatory changes may be 
correlated with firm size. First, we replicate the analyses using the subset of large firms (firms 
with market value above the sample median in 2003). Second, we use the residual information 
score (the residual from the regression of I_Score on firm size) in the analyses. The results for the 
variables of interest remain similar and are available upon request.  
While these additional tests increase our confidence in the inferences, we would like to 
point out that because of the many regulatory changes over the sample period, it is still possible 
that our results may be attributed to the other contemporaneous regulatory changes. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of the recent regulatory requirement of majority 
board independence in reducing earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority 
independent board in the pre-regulation period have to increase their board independence. This 
provides a natural experiment to examine whether increases in board independence lead to 
decreases in earnings management.  
Our sample consists of 1,587 firms that have board structure information over 2000-2005 
from BoardEx and available financial data. Among these firms, 722 did not have a majority 
independent board in 2000 (referred to as non-compliance firms), while the rest already had a 
majority independent board in 2000 (referred to as compliance firms). We compare the change in 
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the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals (|DA|) from the pre-regulation 
period (2000-2001) to the post-regulation period (2005-2006) between non-compliance and 
compliance firms. We find that (1) on average non-compliance firms do not experience an 
incremental reduction in |DA| compared to compliance firms; (2) non-compliance firms with low 
information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in |DA| compared to non-
compliance firms with high information acquisition cost. These results remain similar when we 
use the predicted change in board independence to explain the change in |DA|, when we examine 
the change in audit committee independence, and when we use alternative measures of earnings 
management and information acquisition cost. We also find that the reduction in |DA|, as 
explained by the change in board independence and information acquisition cost, is associated 
with better future firm performance. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing direct evidence on the effectiveness of 
the recent board structure reforms in reducing earnings management and by linking the reduction 
in earnings management to improvement in future firm performance. The setting of mandated 
increases in board independence is less likely to be subject to endogeneity than other settings. In 
addition, we demonstrate that increases in board independence are more effective in reducing 
earnings management when independent directors have easier access to information.  
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Appendix A 
Measurement and description of control variables 
   
Panel A: Variable Measurement 
 
|DA| = the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals; the accruals 
model is the modified Jones model as described in prior studies (e.g., Kothari et 
al. 2005; Yu 2008; Cohen et al. 2008) and is estimated every year in the 
Compustat population for each industry that has at least fifteen observations 
(industries defined as in Fama and French (1997)); we then partition the firms 
in each industry into deciles based on the prior year’s return on assets (ROA 
deciles); performance-matched discretionary accruals are measured as the 
difference between the firm’s discretionary accruals and the median 
discretionary accruals for the ROA decile the firm belongs to; to reduce the 
influence of outliers, we winsorize |DA| at the 1st and 99th percentiles; 
I_Score = information access score; the score is calculated based on four firm 
characteristics in year 2000: (1) turnover – average daily trading volume over 
the year scaled by the total number of shares outstanding; (2) average bid-ask 
spread; for each trade, the bid-ask spread is measured as the difference between 
bid and ask price scaled by the average of the two; following Anderson et al. 
(2009), we use all the trades for the firm from the third Wednesday of each 
month to calculate monthly average bid-ask spread; we then take the average 
across the 12 months to get the average bid-ask spread over the year; (3) 
analyst coverage – the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts in the 
year, and (4) forecast error – the absolute value of the difference between actual 
EPS and the consensus analyst forecast before earnings announcements, scaled 
by stock price at the beginning of the year; we take the average of  the quintile 
ranks of these four variables (the ranks denoted as 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1) 
(reverse ranks for bid-ask spread and forecast error) so that the range is [0, 1]; 
in the regression analyses, I_Score is standardized (subtracting the sample 
mean and then dividing by the sample standard deviation) so that it has a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of 1;  
INST = percentage of shares owned by institutional investors as reported in the 
CDA/Spectrum database;
ROA = return on assets, calculated as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to 
total assets; 
M/B = the market-to-book ratio, calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity to 
the book value of equity; 
Size = natural logarithm of the market value of equity; 
Financing = an indicator variable for debt or equity financing; it equals 1 if the firm reports 
cash flows from either issuance of debts or sales of common stocks in the year, 
and 0 otherwise; 
LEV = leverage, measured as total long-term debt scaled by total assets;
AC = analyst coverage, measured as the number of unique analysts who issue at least 
one earnings forecast in the year; in the regression analyses, we take the natural 
logarithm of AC (i.e., ln(1+AC));
Std_CFO = standard deviation of cash flows from operations (scaled by total assets); we use 
the period 1998-2001 for pre-regulation estimation and the period 2003-2006 for 
post-regulation estimation. 
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Appendix A (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Description of control variables 
 
The choice of the control variables follows prior research. Institutional investors can serve a monitoring 
role and alleviate managers’ opportunistic self-serving behavior (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986; 
McConnell and Servaes 1990). Several studies find that higher institutional ownership is associated with 
lower extent of earnings management (e.g., Chung, Firth, and Kim 2002). We thus expect a negative 
coefficient on 'INST. We include return-on-asset (ROA) because firm performance potentially affects 
managers’ incentive to engage in earnings management (Chung et al. 2002). We expect that firms with 
poor performance are more likely to engage in earnings management, and thus a negative coefficient on 
'ROA. The market-to-book ratio (M/B) captures firms’ growth opportunities. Skinner and Sloan (2002) 
show that the consequences of missing earnings forecasts are more severe for growth firms, and thus firms 
with high market-to-book ratio are a priori more likely to engage in earnings management (Chung and 
Kallapur 2003). Therefore, 'M/B is expected to be positively correlated with '|DA|. Previous research 
suggests that firm size is positively associated with discretionary accruals (Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and 
Park 1997; Chung et al. 2002). We thus expect a positive coefficient on 'Size. Following prior research 
(DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003), we 
control for firms’ external financing activities because managers might engage in earnings management 
before debt or stock issuance. We use an indicator variable (Financing) to capture debt or equity issuance. 
Prior studies provide mixed results regarding the association between financing activities and the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals. For example, Frankel et al. (2002) find an insignificant coefficient on 
the indicator variable for securities issuance, while Chung and Kallapur (2003) find a positive coefficient. 
Hence we have no directional prediction for 'Financing. Prior research argues that firms have incentives 
to engage in earnings management to relax debt covenant and to avoid debt covenant violation (e.g., 
Sweeney 1994). We use leverage (LEV) to proxy for the closeness of debt covenant violation. Yu (2008) 
finds that analyst coverage reduces the extent of earnings management. Lastly, as suggested in Hribar and 
Nichols (2007), we control for the impact of operating volatility on the unsigned abnormal accruals by 
including the standard deviation of cash flows from operations (Std_CFO). We expect the coefficient on 
'LEV, 'AC, and 'Std_CFO to be positive, negative, and positive, respectively.  
  
33 
 
Appendix B 
Predicting the change in board independence and audit committee independence  
 
This table reports the results from the prediction model that explains the change in board independence and 
audit committee independence between 2000 and 2005. The sample includes 1,587 firms with data on 
board structure over 2000-2005 and available financial information to calculate discretionary accruals and 
other variables. Board (audit committee) independence is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board (audit committee). Non_Compliance equals one for firms that did not have a majority independent 
board in 2000 (722 firms), and zero otherwise. Non_Compliance_Audit equals one for firms that did not 
have a 100% independent audit committee in 2000 (759 firms), and zero otherwise. Following Duchin et 
al. (2010), we include firm characteristics in 2000 as explanatory variables: board size (Board_Size), 
leverage (LEV), firm age (Firm_Age), firm size (Size), and industry fixed affects. Board_Size is the 
number of directors on the board, LEV is long-term debt scaled by total assets, Firm_Age is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s first appearance in the Compustat database, Size is the 
natural logarithm of year-end market value. For brevity, the coefficients on industry fixed effects are not 
reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
 
Panel A: Predicting the change in board independence 
 
  
 (1) 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(2) 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Non_Compliance  0.223*** 0.189*** 
  (32.31) (26.73) 
Non_Compliance_Audit   0.090*** 
   (12.65) 
Board_Size  0.083*** 0.069*** 
  (5.75) (4.96) 
LEV  0.033 0.030 
  (1.62) (1.55) 
Firm_Age  -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  (-2.79) (-2.93) 
Size  0.018*** 0.014*** 
  (9.78) (7.81) 
    
Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES 
N  1,587 1,587 
Adj. R2  0.456 0.507 
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Appendix B (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Predicting the change in audit committee independence 
 
  
 (1) 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(2) 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Non_Compliance   0.067*** 
   (8.50) 
Non_Compliance_Audit  0.395*** 0.370*** 
  (52.70) (46.80) 
Board_Size  -0.000 0.001 
  (-0.01) (0.08) 
LEV  0.035 0.035 
  (1.59) (1.64) 
Firm_Age  -0.020*** -0.014** 
  (-3.43) (-2.47) 
Size  0.000 0.001 
  (0.13) (0.74) 
    
Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES 
N  1,587 1,587 
Adj. R2  0.655 0.670 
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Appendix C 
Increases in board independence, information access, and changes in earnings management  
– Robustness checks of the results in Table 4 
This table reports the robustness checks of the results in Table 4. The model specification and variable measurements are the same as in Table 4 
unless otherwise noted. For brevity, only the coefficients on the key variables are reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses, except for 
robustness regressions where Chi-square statistics are reported. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
Panel A: Robustness regressions, alternative definitions of dependent and independent variables, and alternative sample  
In columns (1) and (2), we use a commonly used robustness regression, the M-estimation in SAS. In columns (3) and (4), ∆|DA| is measured as the 
difference in |DA| between 2000 and 2005. In column (5), the Non_Compliance indicator is redefined based on board structure in both 2000 and 
2005; it is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 but had a majority independent board in 2005, and zero otherwise. In 
columns (6) and (7), we exclude the non-compliance firms that only marginally satisfied the requirement in 2005 (defined as firms that would not 
have satisfied the requirement if one independent director were re-classified as affiliated) as well as the non-compliance firms that did not satisfy the 
requirement in 2005.  
 Robustness regressions ǂ 
 ∆|DA| measured as the 
difference in |DA| 
between 2000 and 
2005 
 Non_Compliance 
indicator 
based on 2000  
and 2005 
 Excluding non-compliance 
firms that do not comply in 
2005 or marginally comply 
in 2005 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  
Non_Compliance 0.002   -0.001   0.001  -0.001  
 (0.46)   (-0.35)   (0.39)  (-0.17)  
Non_Compliance ×  -0.008***    -0.009**   -0.011***  -0.010***  
I_Score (8.14)   (-2.14)   (-3.68)  (-2.91)  
' Board_Ind  0.015   0.008     0.006 
  (2.04)   (0.48)     (0.50) 
' Board_Ind × I_Score  -0.033***   -0.045***     -0.045*** 
  (10.17)   (-2.71)     (-3.63) 
I_Score 0.000 0.002  -0.001 0.002  0.000  0.000 0.004 
 (0.00) (0.59)  (-0.35) (0.66)  (0.09)  (0.07) (1.34) 
Control Variables YES YES  YES YES  YES  YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES  YES YES 
N 1,587 1,587  1,587 1,587  1,587  1,375 1,375 
Adj. R2 0.117 0.118  0.070 0.072  0.113  0.114 0.117 
ǂ Chi-square statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
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Appendix C (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Robustness checks with respect to control variables  
In columns (1) and (2), we further control for the change in R&D expenditures from 2000 to 2005. In columns (3) and (4), we further control for the 
change in I_Score from 2000 to 2005. In columns (5) and (6), we include the lagged change in |DA|, measured as the difference in |DA| between 
1999 and 2000. In columns (7) and (8), we control for the change in the volatility of earnings and returns in place of the change in the standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations. In columns (9) and (10), we replace ROA with cash flows from operations. 
 
 
Controlling for  
change in R&D 
 
Controlling for  
change in I_Score 
 Controlling for 
change in |DA| 
between 1999 and 
2000 
 Controlling for 
change in the 
volatility of earnings 
and returns 
 
Replacing ROA with 
cash flows from 
operations 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Non_Compliance 0.001   0.001   0.004   -0.000   0.000  
 (0.30)   (0.32)   (1.55)   (-0.10)   (0.15)  
Non_Compliance  -0.009***   -0.009***   -0.005*   -0.007**   -0.010***  
× I_Score (-3.14)   (-3.14)   (-1.82)   (-2.49)   (-3.19)  
' Board_Ind  0.012   0.013   0.023**   0.008   0.009 
  (0.97)   (1.08)   (2.01)   (0.65)   (0.76) 
' Board_Ind   -0.041***   -0.041***   -0.026**   -0.033***   -0.043*** 
× I_Score  (-3.52)   (-3.52)   (-2.38)   (-2.80)   (-3.67) 
I_Score -0.000 0.003  -0.000 0.002  -0.001 0.000  -0.000 0.002  -0.000 0.003 
 (-0.05) (0.95)  (-0.21) (0.78)  (-0.64) (0.09)  (-0.23) (0.63)  (-0.08) (1.05) 
 
Control Variables YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Industry Fixed  
Effects YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
N 1,587 1,587  1,587 1,587  1,428 1,428  1,586 1,586  1,587 1,587 
Adj. R2 0.111 0.112  0.111 0.112  0.248 0.249  0.110 0.111  0.107 0.109 
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Table 1 
Over-time change in board independence for compliance and non-compliance firms 
 
The sample includes 1,587 firms from the BoardEx with data on board structure over 2000-2005 and 
available financial information to calculate discretionary accruals and other variables. This table presents 
the average board independence and the percentage of firms with a majority independent board, that is, a 
board where more than 50 percent of the directors are independent, for compliance and non-compliance 
firms. Compliance firms refer to those with a majority independent board in 2000 and the rest are non-
compliance firms.  
 
  
Compliance firms 
(N=865)  
Non-compliance firms 
(N=722) 
Year  
Mean board 
independence 
% of firms with a majority 
independent board
Mean board 
independence
% of firms with a majority 
independent board
2000  67.99% 100.00% 38.82% 0.00%
2001  70.11% 96.41% 45.56% 25.07%
2002  72.79% 97.10% 52.92% 49.17%
2003  74.74% 96.18% 61.53% 72.16%
2004  76.49% 97.45% 67.19% 88.37%
2005  76.81% 98.15%* 69.93% 94.32%*
 
* The primary reason why some firms did not comply with the majority independent board requirement by 
2005 (according to the BoardEx) is that there are differences in the definition of independent directors 
between the firm and the BoardEx; the BoardEx’s definition tends to be stricter. 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics on our earnings management proxy, information score, and 
control variables. The sample includes 1,587 firms with data on board structure over 2000-2005 and 
available financial information to calculate discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. The firm 
characteristics are reported for pre-regulation (2000) and post-regulation (2005), except for |DA|, for which 
we report the two-year average over the periods 2000-2001 and 2005-2006.  Compliance firms refer to 
those with a majority independent board in 2000 and the rest are non-compliance firms. Panel A reports 
the statistics for the full sample, Panel B for compliance firms, and Panel C for non-compliance firms. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for all firms (N=1,587) 
 
Pre-regulation 
(2000) 
Post-regulation 
(2005) 
p-value based 
on t-test for 
diff. in mean  
p-value based 
on z-test for 
diff. in median mean median mean median 
|DA|  0.069 0.052 0.054 0.040 0.001 0.001 
I_Score  0.508 0.500  0.519 0.563  0.264 0.300 
INST 0.328 0.348 0.450 0.488 0.001 0.001 
ROA 0.024 0.051 0.031 0.053 0.176 0.379 
M/B 3.517 2.410 3.024 2.145 0.001 0.001 
Size 6.307 6.317 6.828 6.866 0.001 0.001 
Financing 0.552 1.000 0.485 0.000 0.001 0.001 
LEV 0.173 0.126 0.161 0.112 0.059 0.010 
AC 8.961 6.000 10.156 8.000 0.001 0.001 
Std_CFO  0.068 0.049  0.052 0.037  0.001 0.001 
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Table 2 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for compliance firms (N=865) 
 
Pre-regulation 
(2000) 
Post-regulation 
(2005) 
p-value based 
on t-test for 
diff. in mean  
p-value based 
on z-test for 
diff. in median mean median mean median 
|DA|  0.066 0.051 0.053 0.039 0.001 0.001 
I_Score  0.508 0.563  0.512 0.563  0.781 0.908 
INST 0.343 0.374 0.452 0.487 0.001 0.001 
ROA 0.028 0.053 0.029 0.053 0.872 0.922 
M/B 3.434 2.431 3.040 2.150 0.038 0.003 
Size 6.332 6.352 6.851 6.876 0.001 0.001 
Financing 0.542 1.000 0.482 0.000 0.012 0.013 
LEV 0.173 0.126 0.158 0.114 0.093 0.063 
AC 9.079 6.000 10.097 8.000 0.031 0.001 
Std_CFO  0.065 0.049  0.051 0.037  0.001 0.001 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for non-compliance firms (N=722) 
 
Pre-regulation 
(2000) 
Post-regulation 
(2005) 
p-value based 
on t-test for 
diff. in mean  
p-value based 
on z-test for 
diff. in median mean median mean median 
|DA| 0.072 0.052 0.057 0.042 0.001 0.001 
I_Score  0.507 0.500  0.527 0.563  0.173 0.163 
INST 0.309 0.316 0.448 0.492 0.001 0.001 
ROA 0.018 0.046 0.032 0.052 0.070 0.240 
M/B 3.617 2.360 3.004 2.138 0.007 0.003 
Size 6.278 6.271 6.800 6.857 0.001 0.001 
Financing 0.564 1.000 0.489 0.000 0.004 0.004 
LEV 0.173 0.126 0.164 0.110 0.331 0.075 
AC 8.819 6.000 10.227 8.000 0.007 0.001 
Std_CFO  0.071 0.049  0.052 0.037  0.001 0.001 
 
Note that the change in the firm characteristics (mean or median) is insignificantly different between 
compliance and non-compliance firms except for INST. The increase in INST is significantly larger for 
non-compliance firms than for compliance firms.   
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Table 3  
Increases in board independence and changes in earnings management  
This table reports the regression results of the following models: 
HDD '  ControlsβComplianceNon|=DA| 10     (1)  
HDD ''  ControlsβIndBoard|=DA| 10     (1')  
The sample includes 1,587 firms with data on board structure over 2000-2005 and available financial 
information to calculate discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. ∆|DA| is measured as the difference in 
average |DA| between the pre-regulation period (2000-2001) and the post-regulation period (2005-2006). 
Non_Compliance is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 (non-compliance 
firms), and zero otherwise. 'Board_Ind is the predicted change in board independence as estimated in Panel A, 
Column (2) of Appendix B. The control variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following 
variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, Financing, LEV, AC, and Std_CFO. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
For brevity, the coefficients on industry fixed effects are not reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-
sided tests.  
 Non_Compliance indicator Predicted change in board independence 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.018* -0.018* 
 (-1.81) (-1.73) 
Non_Compliance 0.001  
 (0.17)  
' Board_Ind  -0.001 
  (-0.08) 
'INST -0.018** -0.018** 
 (-2.08) (-2.06) 
'ROA -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (-2.79) (-2.78) 
'M/B 0.000 0.000 
 (0.46) (0.46) 
'Size 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (4.02) (3.97) 
'Financing 0.003 0.003 
 (1.07) (1.07) 
'LEV -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.30) (-0.30) 
'AC 0.000 0.000 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
'Std_CFO 0.256*** 0.255*** 
 (10.18) (10.18) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
N 1,587 1,587 
Adj. R2 0.102 0.102 
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Table 4 
Increases in board independence, information access, and changes in earnings management  
 
This table reports the regression results of the following models: 
 
HDDDD u'  ControlsβScoreIScoreIComplianceNonComplianceNon|=DA| 3210 (2) 
 
HDDDD u'''  ControlsβScoreIScoreIIndBoardIndBoard|=DA| 310 2   (2') 
 
The sample includes 1,587 firms with data on board structure over 2000-2005 and available financial 
information to calculate discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. ∆|DA| is measured as the 
difference in average |DA| between the pre-regulation period (2000-2001) and the post-regulation period 
(2005-2006). Non_Compliance is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 
(non-compliance firms), and zero otherwise. 'Board_Ind is the predicted change in board independence as 
estimated in Panel A, Column (2) of Appendix B. Information access score (I_Score) is used as the proxy 
for the ease of information access or the inverse proxy for the information acquisition cost. The control 
variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, Financing, 
LEV, AC, and Std_CFO. See Appendix A for variable definitions. For brevity, the coefficients on industry 
fixed effects are not reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
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Table 4 (Cont’d) 
 
 Non_Compliance indicator  
Predicted change in board 
independence 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.018* -0.018* 
 (-1.76) (-1.76) 
Non_Compliance 0.001  
 (0.28)  
Non_Compliance × I_Score -0.009***  
 (-3.11)  
' Board_Ind  0.011 
  (0.95) 
' Board_Ind × I_Score  -0.041*** 
  (-3.51) 
I_Score -0.000 0.002 
 (-0.08) (0.93) 
'INST -0.020** -0.023*** 
 (-2.24) (-2.59) 
'ROA -0.027*** -0.026*** 
 (-2.64) (-2.58) 
'M/B 0.000 0.000 
 (0.35) (0.32) 
'Size 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (3.10) (3.20) 
'Financing 0.003 0.003 
 (1.14) (1.16) 
'LEV -0.005 -0.004 
 (-0.50) (-0.48) 
'AC 0.000 0.000 
 (0.17) (0.16) 
'Std_CFO 0.254*** 0.254*** 
 (10.15) (10.19) 
 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
N 1,587 1,587 
Adj. R2 0.111 0.112 
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Table 5 
Latent class regression analysis for the relation between the change in board independence  
and the change in earnings management  
 
This table reports the latent class regression of the change in the extent of earnings management (∆|DA|) on the predicted change in board 
independence (∆Board_Ind). The sample includes 1,587 firms with data on board structure over 2000-2005 and available financial information to 
calculate discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. ∆|DA| is measured as the difference in average |DA| between the pre-regulation period 
(2000-2001) and the post-regulation period (2005-2006). 'Board_Ind is the predicted change in board independence as estimated in Panel A, 
Column (2) of Appendix B.  The number of clusters is determined to be two based on the consistent Akaike information criterion. Panel A reports 
the means of firm characteristics by cluster. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Panel B reports the means of director characteristics by cluster. 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses.*, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-
sided t-tests.  
 
Panel A: Regression results and firm characteristics  
Cluster Intercept ∆Board_Ind 
# firms  
(% of 
sample) I_Score INST ROA M/B Size Financing LEV Std_CFO 
 
I -0.043*** -0.039*** 
 
762 
 
0.538 0.334 0.025 4.057 6.407 0.524 0.155 0.076 
 (-12.30) (-2.52) (48.02%)
            
II 0.018*** 0.003 
 
825  
 
0.480 0.322 0.022 3.018 6.215 0.577 0.190 0.060 
 (6.07) (0.24) (51.98%)
 
T-statistics for the differences in mean firm 
characteristics: 4.12*** 1.10 0.42 4.34*** 1.81* -2.08** -3.77*** 4.88*** 
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Table 5 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Characteristics of the newly appointed directors for non-compliance firms by cluster  
The characteristics of the newly appointed directors for non-compliance firms are measured in 2005. For cluster I and II, there are 1,106 and 1,275 
newly appointed directors, respectively.   
 
     Employment background 
 
Expertise  
Cluster 
# firms  
(% of 
sample)   Age  
Number of 
firms 
 directors  
worked for in 
the past 
Number of senior 
executive 
 positions 
directors 
held in the past  
Currently 
retired or 
not 
 
Accounting 
Currently 
CEO of 
another 
firm or not 
Investment  
banking 
Number 
of board 
meetings 
    
I 
 
762 
 
  57.7 
 
1.96 
 
2.13 0.165 
 
0.074 0.168 0.161 7.478 
 (48.02%)    
             
II 
 
825  
 
  57.6 
 
1.79 
 
1.98 0.173 
 
0.082 0.185 0.151 7.391 
 (51.98%)     
 
T-statistics for the differences 
in mean director 
characteristics: 0.33 3.05*** 2.64*** -0.46 
 
-0.67 -1.07 0.70 0.40 
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Table 6 
Increases in board independence, information access, and changes in earnings management: 
Using alternative proxies for information acquisition costs 
 
This table reports the regression results based on alternative proxies for information acquisition costs: 
 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൈ ܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊_ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ ൅ ߙଷܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊_ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ   
 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ'ܤ݋ܽݎ݀_ܫ݊݀ ൅ ߙଶ'ܤ݋ܽݎ݀_ܫ݊݀ ൈ ܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊_ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ ൅ ߙଷܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊_ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ    
        
The sample includes 1,587 firms with data on board structure over 2000-2005 and available financial information to calculate discretionary accruals 
(DA) and other variables. ∆|DA| is measured as the difference in average |DA| between the pre-regulation period (2000-2001) and the post-
regulation period (2005-2006). Non_Compliance is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 (non-compliance firms), 
and zero otherwise. 'Board_Ind is the predicted change in board independence as estimated in Panel A, Column (2) of Appendix B. We use three 
alternative proxies for information access (Information_Access). The first is the measure in Duchin et al. (2010), based on the average quintile 
ranking of analyst coverage, forecast error, and forecast dispersion (reverse ranks for forecast error and forecast dispersion). The second is analyst 
coverage (natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm). The third one is industry homogeneity. Following Parrino (1997), for 
each firm in the industry (industries defined by two-digit SICs), we first calculate the percentage of the variation in monthly stock returns that is 
explained by an equal-weighted industry index over the previous ten years. We then measure industry homogeneity as the median across all firms in 
the industry. The assumption is that the more the stock prices of firms in the industry move together, the more homogeneous the industry is. All 
three proxies are measured in 2000 and standardized for regression analyses (i.e., subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard 
deviation). The control variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, Financing, LEV, AC, and 
Std_CFO. See Appendix A for variable definitions. For brevity, the coefficients on control variables and industry fixed effects are not reported. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-
sided tests.  
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Table 6 (Cont’d) 
 
  
Information Access = 
Duchin_Score  
Information Access = 
Analyst coverage  
Information Access = 
Industry homogeneity 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Intercept  -0.019* -0.019*  -0.019* -0.018*  -0.018* -0.018* 
  (-1.88) (-1.84)  (-1.87) (-1.80)  (-1.82) (-1.78) 
Non_Compliance  0.001   0.000   0.000  
  (0.21)   (0.06)   (0.16)  
Non_Compliance × Information _Access 
 
 -0.007**   -0.006**   -0.007***  
 (-2.28)   (-2.11)   (-2.40)  
' Board_Ind   0.006   0.004   0.001 
   (0.49)   (0.34)   (0.07) 
' Board_Ind × Information _Access 
 
  -0.026**   -0.025**   -0.024** 
  (-2.22)   (-2.17)   (-2.12) 
Information _Access  0.000 0.002  0.001 0.002  0.005 0.006 
  (0.22) (0.68)  (0.28) (0.84)  (1.40) (1.57) 
 
Control Variables  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N  1,587 1,587  1,587 1,587  1,587 1,587 
Adj. R2  0.105 0.105  0.104 0.104  0.104 0.104 
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Table 7 
Increases in board independence, information access, and changes in earnings management: 
Using alternative proxies for earnings management 
 
This table reports the regression results based on alternative proxies for earnings management: 
 
HDDDD u '  ControlsβScoreIScoreIComplianceNonComplianceNonEM 3210    
HDDDD u'''  ControlsβScoreIScoreIIndBoardIndBoard=EM 310 2     
 
The sample is from the 1,587 firms with data on board structure over 2000-2005 and available financial 
information to calculate earnings management proxies and other variables. The sample for the regressions 
varies depending on the availability of the specific earnings management proxy. ∆EM is measured as the 
difference in average EM between the pre-regulation period (2000-2001) and the post-regulation period 
(2005-2006). EM is one of the following two proxies: |DD| and Real_EM. |DD| is the absolute value of the 
residual from the cross-sectional regressions of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, estimated by 
industry-year. Real_EM is the extent of real earnings management; it is measured as abnormal production 
costs minus abnormal discretionary expenditures, both scaled by lagged assets. See Roychowdhury (2006) 
for the measurement of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures. 
Non_Compliance is one for firms that did not have a majority independent board in 2000 (non-compliance 
firms), and zero otherwise. 'Board_Ind is the predicted change in board independence as estimated in 
Panel A, Column (2) of Appendix B. Information access score (I_Score) is used as the proxy for the ease 
of information access or the inverse proxy for the information acquisition cost. The control variables 
include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following variables: INST, ROA, M/B, Size, Financing, LEV, AC, 
and Std_CFO. See Appendix A for variable definitions. For brevity, the coefficients on control variables 
and industry fixed effects are not reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests.  
 
  ∆EM= ∆|DD|  ∆EM= ∆Real_EM 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept  0.019 0.020  -0.011 -0.012 
  (1.19) (1.23)  (-0.24) (-0.26) 
Non_Compliance  0.000   0.004  
  (0.07)   (0.27)  
Non_Compliance × 
I_Score 
 -0.006**   -0.036***  
 (-1.96)   (-2.63)  
' Board_Ind   -0.002   0.047 
   (-0.14)   (0.86) 
' Board_Ind × I_Score   -0.035***   -0.165*** 
   (-2.89)   (-3.09) 
I_Score  0.000 0.004  0.039*** 0.050*** 
  (0.15) (1.37)  (3.98) (4.15) 
 
Control Variables  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES  YES YES 
N  1,296 1,296  1,451 1,451 
Adj. R2  0.141 0.144  0.051 0.053 
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Table 8 
Increases in audit committee independence, information access, and changes in earnings 
management  
 
This table reports the regression results based on increases in audit committee independence: 
 
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁_ܣݑ݀݅ݐ ൅ ߙଶܰ݋݊_ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁_ܣݑ݀݅ݐ ൈ ܫ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൅ ߙଷܫ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൅
ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ  
∆|ܦܣ| ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ'ܣݑ݀݅ݐ_ܫ݊݀ ൅ ߙଶ'ܣݑ݀݅ݐ_ܫ݊݀ ൈ ܫ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൅ ߙଷܫ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൅ ࢼܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ    
 
The sample includes 1,587 firms with data on board structure over 2000-2005 and available financial 
information to calculate discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. ∆|DA| is measured as the 
difference in average |DA| between the pre-regulation period (2000-2001) and the post-regulation period 
(2005-2006). Non_Compliance_Audit is one for firms that did not have a 100% independent audit 
committee in 2000 (759 firms), and zero otherwise. 'Audit_Ind is the predicted change in audit committee 
independence as estimated in Panel B, Column (2) of Appendix B. Information access score (I_Score) is 
used as the proxy for the ease of information access or the inverse proxy for the information acquisition 
cost. The control variables include changes from 2000 to 2005 in the following variables: INST, ROA, 
M/B, Size, Financing, LEV, AC, and Std_CFO. See Appendix A for variable definitions. For brevity, the 
coefficients on control variables and industry fixed effects are not reported. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
based on two-sided tests.  
 
 
Non_Compliance_Audit 
indicator  
Predicted change 
in audit committee 
independence 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.017* -0.017* 
 (-1.73) (-1.75) 
Non_Compliance_Audit  0.000  
 (0.13)  
Non_Compliance_Audit × I_Score -0.009***  
 (-2.93)  
' Audit _Ind  0.001 
  (0.15) 
' Audit _Ind × I_Score  -0.026*** 
  (-3.42) 
I_Score -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.22) (-0.16) 
 
Control Variables YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
N 1,587 1,587 
Adj. R2 0.110 0.112 
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Table 9  
Association between the predicted change in earnings management and future performance 
 
This table reports the results of the following regressions: 
 
CFO ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐ݁݀	'|ܦܣ| ൅ ߙଶߪେ୊୓ ൅ ߙଷܮܽ݃ሺܥܨܱሻ ൅ ߙସܮ݊	ሺܣݏݏ݁ݐݏሻ ൅ ߝ    
ROA ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐ݁݀	'|ܦܣ| ൅ ߙଶߪୖ୓୅ ൅ ߙଷܮܽ݃ሺܥܨܱሻ ൅ ߙସܮܽ݃ሺܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏሻ ൅ ߙହܮ݊	ሺܣݏݏ݁ݐݏሻ ൅ ߝ 
   
The sample includes 1,587 firms with data on board structure over 2000-2005 and available financial 
information to calculate discretionary accruals (DA) and other variables. CFO and ROA are measured as 
the average of CFO and ROA in the post-regulation period 2005-2006. CFO is cash flows from operating 
activities scaled by lagged total assets and ROA is income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total 
assets. Predicted ∆|DA| is the sum of the product of the following three variables and their corresponding 
coefficients in Column (2) of Table 4: 'Board_Ind, I_Score, and 'Board_Ind × I_Score. VCFO (VROA) is 
the standard deviation of ROA (CFO) for the five-year window of 1999-2003. Lag(CFO) (Lag(Accruals)) 
is the average CFO (total accruals scaled by total assets) over the pre-regulation period 2000-2001. 
Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of average total assets over 2000-2001. |DA| (Post-regulation) is |DA| 
in the post-regulation period 2005-2006. For brevity, the coefficients on industry fixed effects are not 
reported. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sided tests. 
 
CFO ROA CFO ROA 
Intercept 0.078*** 0.048* 0.100*** 0.100*** 
(3.24) (1.87) (4.04) (3.81) 
Predicted '|DA|  -1.194*** -1.335*** -1.162*** -1.248*** 
(-2.61) (-2.65) (-2.55) -(2.51) 
VCFO -0.137***  -0.120***  
(-3.70)  (-3.25)  
VROA  -0.166***  -0.147*** 
 (-5.61)  (-5.03) 
Lag(CFO) 0.366*** 0.324*** 0.359*** 0.308*** 
(17.90) (14.24) (17.55) (13.70) 
Lag(Accruals)  -0.005  -0.007 
 (-0.31)  (-0.45) 
Ln(Assets) 0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.13) (1.37) (-0.59) (0.21) 
|DA| (Post-regulation)   -0.229*** -0.502*** 
  (-3.47) (-7.02) 
    
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 
Adj. R2 0.344 0.336 0.349 0.356 
 
 
